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the District of Columbia courts for release.33 Ahrens-v. Clark standing alone

would have deprived these petitioners of effective habeas corpus relief.34
The restrictions on the "freedom writ" introduced by Ahrens v. Clark can
best be overcome by statute. For the protection of Americans imprisoned abroad
by American military personnel, an act has been proposed which stipulates that
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall assign to designated district courts
the duty of passing on the merits of habeas corpus petitions presented by
citizens who are not within the territorial jurisdiction of any federal district
court.35 The Attorney General is to be named respondent in all such proceedings.
A similar statute, providing that district courts shall have the power to issue
writs if the jailer is subject to process,36 would seem necessary for effective
preservation of one of the most "precious safeguard[s] of personal liberty."37
One year after the passage of the statute which the Ahrens decision has construed restrictively, the Supreme Court said: "ITihe general spirit and genius
of our institutions have tended to the widening and enlarging of the habeas
corpus jurisdiction of the courts and judges of the United States. ' ' 3s The reversal of this trend is not a desirable tendency.

MUTUAL AGREEMENT NOT TO COMPETE AS PRECLUDING
RELIEF FOR PATENT INFRINGEMENT
The Kammerer Corporation, holder of a pipe-cutter patent, and its exclusive
licensee, Baash-Ross Tool Co., sought damages and an accounting from the
defendant, McCullough, for infringement. After the patent was found to be valid
and infringed, x the defendant raised the defense that the licensing agreement
33 Burns v. Welch, I59 F. 2d 29 (App. D.C., i947); Sanders v. Allen, zoo F. 2d 717 (App.
D.C., 1938).
34 In McAffee v. Clemmer (App. D.C., Oct. i8, 1948), the court of appeals relied on

Ahrens v. Clark to hold that the District Court of the District of Columbia was without
jurisdiction to grant a writ of habeas corpus to a petitioner who had been sentenced by that
court and confined in the District of Columbia Reformatory at Lorton, Virginia. The court
noted that this decision overruled previous precedents in the same court to the contrary, but
made no mention of the section in the new judicial code, 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1948), which permits the prisoner to make a motion to the court of his conviction at any time "to vacate, set
aside or correct the sentence." Another circuit, confronted with the same problem, held that
a prisoner, who was sentenced by a federal district court in North Carolina and confined in
Georgia, might not seek a writ of habeas corpus in the North Carolina district court. Crowe v.
United States, i69 F. 2d 1022 (C.C.A. 4 th, 1948).
3S Wolfson, Americans Abroad and Habeas Corpus, 9 Fed. Bar J. 142 (1948).
36 Of course, the statute ought to be phrased permissively so that the courts could deny
jurisdiction by invoking the doctrine of forum non conveniens. See Rutledge, J., dissenting
in Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. i88, 207 (,948).
37 Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. i9, 26 (i939).
38 Ex parte Yerges, 8 Wall. (U.S.) 85, ioi (i868).
I Kammerer Corp. v. McCullough, 39 F. Supp. 213 (Calif., i94i), aff'd 138 F. 2d 482
(C.C.A. 9 th, 1943), cert. den. 322 U.S. 739 (1944), rehearing granted 322 U.S. 766 (z944),
writ dismissed and case remanded 323 U.S. 327 (i945).
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between the plaintiffs went beyond the patent monopoly and restrained competition. The licensor had covenanted not to do business either with the devices
covered by the agreement or with competing devices. The licensee had agreed
not to deal with competing devices. The majority opinion held that this covenant extended the patent monopoly and harmed the public by preventing competition with other patents which might otherwise be marketed by the plaintiffs. Enforcement of the infringement decree was refused. The dissent denied
any issue of public interest and claimed that the evidence entirely failed to
establish any way in which the patentee's business practices stifled competitive
forces. McCullough v. Kammerer Corp.2
The issues and decision in this case mark another step in spelling out one of
the most important and controversial aspects of patent law: What constitutes
an extension of the patent monopoly, and, if one is found, how should the
patentee be punished or his rights restrained?
The Supreme Court in an early case decided that the object of the patent
laws was not primarily the creation of private fortunes but the promotion of
progress of science and the useful arts.3 It is true that the Court has repeatedly
sustained the doctrine that the patentee may make no use of his patent if he
so pleases, 4 whether such non-use is reasonable or not. s But it has increasingly
restricted the commercial marketing techniques of the patentee to practices
compatible with the Court's notions of competitive policy. This policy has
reflected changing contract and property concepts 6 and has shown especially
the impact of more recent economic thinking-the recoil from economic con-'
centration and restraint of competition-which has been influenced in great
part by the passage of the anti-trust laws.7
a 66 F. 2d 759 (C.C.A. 9th, 1948).
3 Pennock v. Dialogue, 2 Pet. (U.S.) I, I9(1829); Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal
Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 511 (1917).
4Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405 (i9o8); Special Equipment Co. v. Coe, 324 U.S. 370 (1945). Noteworthy is the dissent of Douglas, J., in which he
exclaimed that it was time to overrule the Paper Bag case and rid the law of a rule that "is
inconsistent with the Constitution and the patent legislation which Congress has enacted."
Ibid., at 381.
sThe Court in Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405 (IoO8),
rejected the lower court's distinction between "simple non-use" and "unreasonable non-use,"
saying that the suppression for the maintenance of old and less efficient machines was probably reasonable.
6See Hamilton, Patents and Free Enterprise 51-85 (U.S. TNEC Monograph 31, 194).
7 The effect of the anti-trust statutes upon patent law is illustrated by many cases: Motion
Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917), and the United Shoe
cases, United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 247 U.S. 32 (z9i8), and United Shoe Mach.
Corp. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451 (1922). Consider also the problem of whether there is a
conflict in policy between the patent and the anti-trust laws. For a view holding that there is
no conflict, see Wood, Patents and Antitrust Law (1942), and Barnett, Patent Property and
the Anti-monopoly Laws (i943). Contra: see the dissent of Rutedge, J., in Hartford-Empire
Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 452 (1946). In general, see Oppenheim, Cases on Federal
Anti-trust Laws 482 (1948).
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Control and punishment of the patentee has come, of course, through government suit under the anti-trust laws." Of perhaps equal importance has been
the refusal of the courts to enforce the patentee's rights of equitable relief against
direct or contributory infringers if the patentee has used his exclusive powers
under the patent laws to extend his patent monopoly over some normally competitive aspect of the market. The McCullough case raises the question of what
practices the courts consider sufficiently nefarious to warrant a denial of equitable relief. Any attempt to answer this question must also consider the antitrust cases as an indication of the trend of the courts' thinking.
In denying relief against infringers, the Supreme Court has indicated two
lines of defense against the patentee. The defense most often invoked relies on
a showing that there has been a misuse of the patent such as to give the patentee
a limited monopoly over some other patented or unpatented article not within
the patent grant. This line, which has been developed principally where there
has been a tie-in arrangement between the patented article and something else,
clearly does not require proof of a violation of the anti-trust laws. Then, in
Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-HoneywellRegulatorCo.,9 the Court first indicated
that the anti-trust laws and not the patent law might be used to decide whether
the patentee's conduct constituted a complete defense for the infringer.
It is in interpreting these approaches that the McCullough court split. The
majority opinion contended that the covenant involved was an extension of the
patent monopoly sufficient to justify a denial of relief. The dissent represents
the position that before the patentee may be denied relief it must be shown
that his actual practices-in effect measured by the staildards of the anti-trust
laws-illegally affected competition.
The misuse doctrine has been given broad application by the Supreme Court
within the last three decades. In 1912 the Court's decision in Henry v. A. B.
Dick Co."° reaffirmed the theory that marked the high-tide of patent control:
Since the patentee might withhold his patent altogether from public use, he
might also impose any condition he chose upon the use of the patented article.
In the Dick case the Court upheld the patentee's right to condition his sale of
the patented article upon the purchaser's agreement to buy accessory materials
exclusively from the patentee. But after the Clayton Act had specifically outlawed the use of contracts tying together the lease or sale of the patented article
and patented or unpatented supplies, the Supreme Court overruled the Dick
case. In Motion PicturePatents Co. v. UniversalFilm Manufacturing Co." the
Court carefully pointed out that such contracts were unlawful independent of
the Act as an extension of the patent monopoly. The decisions of the Court following the Motion Picturecase have consistently refused to aid patentees where
8Sherman Anti-trust Act, 26 Stat. 209 (18go) as amended, i5 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-7 (1941);
Clayton Anti-trust Act, 38 Stat. 730 (1914), x5 U.S.C.A. § 12 et seq. (1941); Federal Trade
Commission Act, 38 Stat. 717 (1914) as amended, iS U.S.C.A. § 41 et seq. (i941).
9.320 U.S. 68o (1944).
"224 U.S. I (r9i2).
"243 U.S. 502 (1917).
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there was an attempt to tie in the patented article with something outside of
2
the patent grant.
The majority in the McCullough case used this concept of illegal extension
of patent monopoly to condemn the licensing agreement between the patentee
and the sole licensee. By the terms of the agreement the patentee agreed not to
"manufacture, sell, rent, license, use or in any way do business with the device
or devices covered by this agreement or with devices which will come or be in
competition with the device or devices covered by this agreement."3 The licensee agreed "not to manufacture or use or rent any device which wil be in
competition with the device or devices covered by this license agreement.'"4
Although such a covenant does not at first glance seem to constitute the same
type of patent extension as a tie-in between the patented article and some
tangible and existing device, article, or supply, the majority thought it came
within the same principles.'s The covenant here, instead of requiring the use of
some other product supplied by the patentee or prohibiting the use of some other
product if supplied by a competitor, sweepingly prohibits the use of all other
devices in competition with the Kammerer patent, in what might loosely be
termed a negative or reverse tie-in. In considering conventional tie-in arrangements the Supreme Court has repeated the broad statement, perhaps applicable
here, that "[iun construing and applying the patent laws as to give effect to the
public policy which limits the granted monopoly strictly to the terms of the
statutory grant.., the particular form or method by which the monopoly is
6
sought to be extended is immaterial."
The federal courts have in earlier cases condemned similar restrictions upon
the freedom to compete. In Blount Manufacturing Co. v. Yale & Towne Manufacturing Co. the Massachusetts Circuit Court announced that "a contract
whereby the manufacturers of two independent patented inventions agree not
to compete in the same commercial field deprives the public of the benefits of
12Carbice Corp. v. American Patents Development Corp., 283 U.S. 27 (,93t); International

Business Machines Corp, v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936); Leitch Mfg. Co. v. Barber Co.,
302 U.S. 458 (1938); United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241 (1942); Morton Salt Co. v.
Suppiger, .314 U.S. 488 (1942); B. B. Chemical Co. v. Ellis, 314 U.S. 495 (1942); Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436 (194o); Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment
Co., 320 U.S. 661 (i944). But see Transparent-Wrap Mach. Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., 329
U.S. 637 (1947). In general, see James, Use of Patents to Control Unpatented Material, 28
J. Pat. Off. Soc. 427 (1946); Bateman, Should Anti-trust Law Penalties or Unenforceability
of the Patent Monopoly Be Invoked for Misuse of the Patent Grant? 29 J. Pat. Off. Soc. i6
('947).
X3McCullough v. Kammerer Corp., i66 F. 2d 759, 760 (C.C.A. 9th, 1948).
14 Ibid.

ISThe court said: "We agree with [the circuit deciding the Lockwasher case] that there is
no difference in principle between extending the monopoly of the patent by suppressing the
manufacture or use of competitive devices, patented or unpatented, and the extension of the
monopoly by prohibiting the use in making the patented article of unpatented articles competing with those made by the licensor's subsidiary, held against the public interest in Morton
Salt Co. v. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 493 .... " Ibid., at 761.
16United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 251-52 (942).
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competition, and creates a restraint of trade... . '"7And in Pope Manufacturing Co. v. Gormully, 8 long before the Motion PicturePatentscase, the Supreme
Court declared a contract unenforceable at equity, even though not void as to
public policy, where the licensee had agreed not to import, manufacture, or sell
devices covered by other of the plaintiff's patents.
The case principally relied upon by the majority in the McCullough decision
was NationalLockwasher Co. v. G. K. GarrettCo.,19 which presented a very similar fact situation. There five licensees agreed, in exchange for the right to manufacture a certain patented spring washer, not to manufacture any competing
spring washers. On the basis of the same general policy decisions relied on
by the McCullough majority concerning extension of patent monopoly as expressed by the Supreme Court, the circuit court held that
...the instant case... falls within the principle of the cases cited to the extent that
the patentee is using the lawful monopoly granted by the patent as a means of suppressing the manufacture and sale of competing unpatented articles. It is not creating
for itself a monopoly for unpatented goods, as in some of the cases cited. But it is attempting by means other than that of free competition to extend the bounds of its
lawful monopoly to make, use and vend the patented device to the extent where such
device would be the only one available to a user of such an article. This monopoly is
obviously not covered by the patent. A patentee's right does not extend to the use of
the patent to purge the market of competing non-patented goods except, of course,
through the process of fair competition.20

In the Lockwasher case it appears that all five manufacturers gave up the
production of other washers upon entering the agreement 2 In the McCullough
case two employees of the licensee Baash had devised the patented pipe cutter
as an improvement upon one already patented and used by Kammerer. To avoid
a conflict of patent rights and to make manufacture possible, Kammerer and
the two Baash employees formed the Kammerer Corporation to hold the new
patent. The Baash Company was given the exclusive license rights under the
agreement already set forth. Between the time of the contract, 1923, and the
bringing of the instant suit, the plaintiffs established a monopoly of the pipecutting business in the United States and did business in foreign countries
as well.
The majority claimed restraint of competition at three points. The first, an
issue not raised by the Lockwasher case, was that the officers and employees of
the licensor, Kammerer Corporation, were restrained from creating new devices
17 i66 Fed. 555, 557 (C.C. Mass., i9og); cf. Jones Cold Store Door Co. v. Jones, io8 Md. 43,
7o Atl. 88 (i9o8), where a contract restraining the assignor of a patent from dealing with similar devices for a period of five years was held void; National Harrow Co. v. Hench, 76 Fed. 667
(C.C. Pa., 1896), where a combination requiring manufacturers to assign their patents to the
corporation set up for that purpose and to take back a license for the manufacture of their
patented harrow, all parties being bound to sell at a uniform price, was held in restraint of
trade.
18 144 U.S. 224 (1892).
20 1bid., at 256.
19 137 F. 2d 255 (C.C.A. 3d, 1943).
2!See note 31 infra.
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to compete with the plaintiffs' present patent. There seems little doubt that
under the covenant the licensee could prevent the licensor from making or from
licensing others to make a pipe-cutting device employing an entirely new invention. But with respect to improvement patents, the majority's contention
does not seem accurate. The first paragraph of the covenant provided that the
license right was to extend to patents "now granted or which may hereafter be
granted on any applications now pending or any patents hereafter obtained on
improvements... said license to continue for the full term of any Letters Patent granted for said inventions or improvements thereon."More important are the conclusions of the McCullough majority opinion
that the covenant restrained competition at two other points: It served to "extend the monopoly of the patent by preventing competition with the patent
of any other pipe cutter, patented or unpatented, manufactured, used or sold
by the licensee, theretofore engaged in making pipe cutting tools,'

'

3

and it pre-

vented the licensor from dealing either with the patented article or with any
competing device.
Considering the position of the licensor first, the dissent argued that the
Kammerer Corporation was a " 'paper corporation' expressly created for the
one and only purpose of holding the Kammerer patent or patents... ; it was
not, and never was, a manufacturing and/or selling company."4 It had "never
competed, or attempted to compete with any one. ' '25 While this may be true,
the license restriction would seem to come within the doctrine of Blount Manufacturing Co. v. Yale & Towne ManufacturingCo.,2 where it was held improper
for a patentee to put into the hands of another the power to restrain the patentee from developing his own patents. And even if the circuit in which the court
here sat did not expressly adopt the Blount view, it seems obvious, as the majority points out, that the covenant restriction did aim at the prevention of such
competition, looking forward to the day when the so-called "paper corporation"
might itself desire to manufacture a third party's device or license others to do
so. This restriction upon the licensor, not present in the Lockwasker situation,
adds to the dissenting judge's difficulty in distinguishing the result of that case.
It is with respect to the restriction upon the licensee, however, that the break
between the majority and dissent becomes more pronounced. Dissenting Judge
Bone read the Lockwasher decision as clearly demonstrating a combination of
six manufacturers "all coldly bent upon the creation of a stifling monopoly in
an entire field which (under facts disclosed at trial) was deliberatelyfashioned
and designed to purge te entire market of competition,"27 while no design was
"2Appellant's supplemental brief at 7.
2"McCullough v. Kammerer Corp., 166 F. 2d 759, 76o
24 Ibid., at 768.
2s Ibid.
26 166

(C.C.A. 9th, 1948).

Fed. 5S5 (C.C. Mass., igo9).

27 McCullough

v. Kammerer Corp., i66 F. 2d 759, 771 (C.C.A. 9th, 1948).
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shown in the instant case to eliminate all or any competition. The report of the
Lockwasher case does not disclose the nature of the schemes indulged in by the
patentee, partly because the court did not get a full report from the master below.2 S8 The decision rests upon the master's finding that the plaintiff had a restrictive licensing policy in operation and upon certain uncontroverted evidence
not disclosed in the opinion. Apparently, then, the contract policy of refusing
to allow the licensees to manufacture competing devices really lay at the roots
of the decision. After stating the form of the covenant, the court concluded:
We think this is enough; enough to show that the plaintiff was using its patent to suppress competition with it by non-patented articles. To the extent that the policy was
successful the supply of competing non-patented washers would, of course, disappear.29
To the same extent the supply of competing pipe cutters would disappear
from the market in the McCullough situation, and the record permits the inference that this was in fact the result. The contract was entered into in 1923.
From that time on the plaintiffs experienced great success. In the course of
years prior to the instant suit, the device had gained a monopoly of the pipecutting business, "all other cutters being supplanted by the cutter of which
[the patentee] had the patent monopoly."3° With the licensor and licensee both
bound by a covenant that aimed at control of the market, it is doubtful that all
of the success emanated from the superiority of the cutter.
One fact does appear, however, that brings the McCullough decision squarely
within the Lockwasher holding. In both cases existing manufacturers3 ' gave up
the production of competitive articles to obtain licenses under the restrictive
covenants. To the extent that this withdrew competition from the market, it
may be said that the covenants were an illegal extension of the patent monopoly.
And though there is no showing in the Lockwasher case of the extent to which
the plaintiff and licensees controlled the market,32 the amount of control exercised by the plaintiffs in the instant case underscores the probable effect of the
'5 The court said: "[W]e are confronted with a record which is not complete in detail. The
special master made one specific finding on the matter of the defendant's contractual policy.
The District Judge regarded the point under discussion as outside the reference to the master.
However that may be, it is not outside the scope of relevancy for us if we have the necessary
facts on which a conclusion may be based." National Lockwasher Co. v. G. K. Garrett Co.,
137 F. 2d 255, 257 (C.C.A. 3d, 1943).
29 Ibid., at 257.

30 McCullough v. Kammerer Corp., 166 F.

2d

759, 761 (C.C.A. 9th, 1948).

31 The McCullough court states definitely that the licensee was an existing manufacturer;
the Lockwasher court speaks of "[t]he patentee issu[ing] licenses to various manufacturers of
metal washers under a standard form of license agreement .... That contract contains a
clause that '(g) Licensee agrees that, while this agreement is in force, it will make and sell no
form of non-entangling spring washers except such as are covered by said patent, and that
it will not, either directly or indirectly, make or sell spring washers of the kind specifically
excluded from this license under the provisions of Paragraph-First (a) hereof."' National
Lockwasher Co. v. G.K. Garrett Co., 137 F. 2d 255, 256-57 (C.C.A. d, 1943).
32 The court said, "It is not disputed that there are other forms of unpatented nontangling
spring washers than those involved in the Loutrel patent." Ibid., at 256.
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contractual withdrawal of the licensee from the production of more than the
one type of pipe cutter. The fact that there was only one licensee in the instant
case and five in the Lockwasher case is hardly a distinguishing factor when the
monopoly position of the single licensee in the McCullough case is taken into
consideration.
But the problem of the McCullough case is not confined to the misuse doctrine. So far as the instant case fails to point out specifically how actual business
practice stifled competition with other devices, it must be taken to stand for the
additional proposition that the agreement not to compete was itself an illegal
extension of the patent monopoly sufficient to justify the refusal of relief. A
number of recent Supreme Court cases support the view that any extension of
the patent monopoly, whether within the anti-trust laws or not, is a sufficient
defense for an infringer.
In Morton Salt Co. v. Suppiger33the circuit court had reversed the trial court
upon the ground that the defendant-infringer had failed to show that the plaintiff-patentee's leases substantially lessened competition or tended to create a
monopoly within the meaning of Section 3 of the Clayton Act. The tie-in contract involved an inconsequential amount of the total volume of all salt business. The Supreme Court overruled the circuit court, holding that a finding
under the Clayton Act need not be made and concluding that the practice shown
was a sufficient extension of the patent monopoly for Equity to "rightly withhold its assistance."34 This result was reached despite the fact that the defendant was a direct infringer and had been in no way harmed by the tie-in-contract
policy of the plaintiff. From this decision it is clear that the controlling criterion
is not the actual amount of competition restrained but the fact that the patentee
was engaging in a practice which restricted commerce and was not within his
patent grant. "The Court... rejects altogether the idea of measuring the
reasonableness of the restraint imposed."3 S Once it is conceded that there is no
real difference in intent between the tie-in cases and agreements not to deal in
competing devices, the McCullough case comes squarely within the Morton
Salt decision.
More recently, in InternationalSalt Co., Inc. v. United States,36 the Supreme
Court condemned tying restrictions similar to those in the Morton Salt case,
holding that under the admitted facts no real issue remained under either the
Sherman or the Clayton Act. "Not only is price fixing unreasonable, per se,...
but also it is unreasonable, per se, to foreclose competitors from any substantial
market .... "37 The tie-in contract in the InternationalSalt case covered and
33-34 U.S. 488 (1942).

3S Wood, Patents and Antitrust Law 86 (1942).
Ibid., at 493.
36332 U.S. 392 (1947).
37 Ibid., at 396. It is interesting to note that the Supreme Court in United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 522 (x948), cited the International Salt case as supporting the
34

proposition that "where a complaint charges that the defendants... have licensed a patented
device on condition that unpatented materials be employed in conjunction with the patented
device, then the amount of commerce involved is immaterial because such restraints are illegal
per se." See Tying Restrictions: Changing Standards of Legality, 48 Col. L. Rev. 733 (1948).
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protected a "substantial market" just as the agreement not to compete covered
and protected the monopolistic market of the plaintiffs in the McCutllough case.
Finally, the challenging statement of Justice Douglas in Mercoid Corp. v.
Mimieapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co.31 that "[t]he legality of any attempt to
bring unpatented goods within the protection of the patent is measured by the
anti-trust laws and not by the patent law"39 should be mentioned. While it will
take a proper case to determine whether this view will ultimately be carried to
the point where all extensions of the patent monopoly are illegal per se under
the anti-trust laws, the language employed at least suggests that the Supreme
Court has developed strict notions of the treatment to be accorded any attempt
at extending the patent monopoly. Certainly it is hard to doubt that such an
obvious attempt to restrain competition as the covenant in the McCullough
case would escape the policy clearly expressed in the Morton Salt and other
recent cases.
The McCullough decision must be regarded as a desirable and positive step
toward protection of competition. If the court had required the infringer to
build a defense showing actual violations of the anti-trust laws arising from the
twenty-five-year old restrictive agreement, the prohibitive nature of the task
would almost certainly have precluded the denial of equitable relief to the patentee. The court is justified in saying, "We won't inquire into actual practices."
To this extent the court is protecting competitive society from the operation of
these covenants.
It is true that the plaintiffs are left free to practice the usual patent safeguards of buying up and shelving competitive patents, of shelving improvement
patents of their own, and of requiring in the licensing agreement the assignment
of all improvement patents.4° But legally, at least, both the licensor and licensee
may now deal with inventors of better pipe cutters, thus giving the public the
benefit of new products offered by the largest producers in the market.
There were available to the licensor and licensee in the McCullough case contractual arrangements which would not seriously threaten competition.4' Once
changes were made so as to "purge" the parties of the charge of patent misuse,
the patentee would be free to punish the infringer McCullough or any other infringers.4 The total effect of these changes upon the patentee would not be to
39Ibid., at 684.
U.S. 68o (i944).
Machine Corp. v. Stokes &Smith Co., 329 U.S. 637 (1947).
4' The covenant against competition would have to be dropped. The patentee could require the assignment of improvement patents. Covenants giving the licensee an exclusive
license for the life of the patent and improvement patents, together with a covenant by the
patentee and licensee to share any profits made from dealing with a competing device, would
give the parties some mutual protection. Or an agreement containing elements of mutual undertaking and responsibility and loss such as to make the agreement a true joint venturewhich was not found here-might eliminate entirely the need for such agreements against competitive devices.
4' It is well settled that once the patentee has shown a change in practices satisfactory to the
court the patentee will be allowed to proceed against the infringer. B. B. Chemical Co. v. Ellis,
38 320

40 Transparent-Wrap
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damage his competitive position in the market-if, as the dissent claimed, his
monopolistic position came from the superiority of the device. But that part
of the patentee's advantageous market position which is traceable to the covenant has been removed and competition restored.

DISQUALIFICATION OF FEDERAL JUDGES FOR
PERSONAL BIAS
Following an appearance before the House Committee on Un-American Activities, Lester Cole, a motion picture script writer, was suspended by his employer, Loew's, Incorporated, on the ground that his conduct before the committee had violated his contract of employment. He brought a suit to restrain
the suspension and to obtain damages. Invoking the disqualification provisions
of Section 21 of the Federal Judicial Code,' the defendants filed an application to
transfer the cause supported by an affidavit that the district judge assigned to
the case, Leon R. Yankwich, had a personal bias against them and in favor of
the plaintiff. The affidavit stated that during a discussion at the home of friends
about the hearings before the House committee Judge Yankwich had said "in
substance and effect that in his opinion there was no legal justification for the
suspension or discharge of any of the persons whose conduct before the committee resulted in their indictment; that he hoped that none of the cases arising
out of such suspensions or discharges came before him, but if they did, he would
have no alternative but to render judgment for the plaintiffs in such actions
and that if he were the attorney for such plaintiffs he could recover judgment
in their favor for millions of dollars. , ,2 The names of persons present, the place,
the occasion, and approximate date of the remarks were included. Treating the
affidavit as true, Judge Yankwich found the facts stated insufficient to show the
personal bias he considered necessary to disqualify him under Section 21. The
section provides: "Whenever a party to any action or proceeding, civil or criminal, shall make and file an affidavit that the judge before whom the action or
proceeding is to be tried or heard has a personal bias or prejudice against him
or in favor of any opposite party to the suit, such judge shall proceed no further
therein.... Every such affidavit shall state the facts and reasons for the belief that such bias or prejudice exists."3 The application for transfer was denied. Cole v. Loew's, 1Tc.4
314 U.S. 495 (i942). There is some dispute as to what the character of the change and

the

length of time have to be. In the Ellis case the court stated that both the method of restraint
of competition must be abandoned and the consequences of the practices fully dissipated. In
general, see Bateman, op. cit. supra note 12, at 6i.
z 36 Stat. logo (1911), 28 U.S.C.A. § 25 (1927).
2 Cole v. Loew's, Inc., 76 F. Supp. 872, 875 (Cal., 1948).
3.36 Stat. 1oo (1911), 28 U.S.C.A. § 25 (i927).

4 76 F. Supp. 872 (Cal., 1948).

